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FLORIDA DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY LAW:
THE NEED FOR REFORM t
ROBERT CRAIG WATERS
The durable power of attorney provides a method of planning for
illness or incapacity that is less expensive and restrictive than legal
guardianship. Yet current Florida law appears to render durable
powers either unenforceable or inaccessible to most of the state's
population. In this Article, the author provides a history of the
durable power, describes the shortcomings of current Florida law,
and proposes broad reform.
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FLORIDA DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY LAW: THE
NEED FOR REFORM
ROBERT CRAIG WATERS*
T HE EXTENSIVE revision of Florida guardianship law enacted in
the 1989 Regular Session,' while deserving of much praise, was
marred by a troubling oversight. Under these reforms, the Legislature
greatly liberalized the process by which courts may appoint guardians
to look after all or part of an incapacitated person's affairs. Yet law-
makers did not extend those reforms into the area of the durable
power of attorney 2-the means by which individuals, without the need
of expensive court hearings, may appoint someone to manage their
* Judicial Assistant to Gerald Kogan, Justice, the Supreme Court of Florida; A.B., 1979,
Brown University; J.D., 1986, University of Florida. Mr. Waters, a former journalist in the
Tallahassee Capitol press corps, is the author of a treatise, R.C. WATERS, AIDS AND FLORIDA
LAW (D & S Publishers 1989), as well as numerous articles on health-care law.
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cially Justice Gerald Kogan and Justice Rosemary Barkett; Supreme Court of Florida librarian
Brian Polley and his staff, Joan Cannon, Jo Dowling and Jo Smyly; Senator Jeanne Malchon;
Teresa Nugent and Yvonne Gsteiger of the staff of the House of Representatives' Health Care
Committee; Blan Teagle; Barbara Yates; Rosette Walsh of the staff of Senator Malchon; Ginny
Robson of Tallahassee AIDS Support Services; and James Cobb.
The views expressed in this Article are entirely those of the author and do not reflect the views
of any other individual or institution.
1. Ch. 89-96, 1989 Fla. Laws 173 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 744.101-.709 (1989)).
2. For a discussion of Florida law on this subject, see Note, The Durable Power of Attor-
ney: An Important Tool for the Florida Estate Planner, 14 STETSON L. REV. 165 (1984) [herein-
after Stetson Note]. For general information on the durable power, see Alexander, Death by
Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 67 (1988); Collin & Meyers, Using a Durable Power of
Attorney for the Authorization of Withdrawal of Medical Care, II EST. PLAN. 282 (1984);
Kapp, Adult Protective Services: The Attorney's Role, 59 FLA. B.J. 23 (1985); Kochman &
Schlesinger, Personal Planning Alternatives for the Elderly Client, 61 FLA. B.J. 17 (1987); Lang-
bein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HAiv. L. REv.
1108 (1984); Meiklejohn, Incompetent Principals, Competent Third Parties, and the Law of
Agency, 61 IND. L.J. 115 (1986); Moore, The Durable Power of Attorney as an Alternative to
the Improper Use of Conservatorship for Health-Care Decisionmaking, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
631 (1986); Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention: Grounds for Upsetting Wills and Will
Substitutes, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (1984); Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REV.
375 (1988); Stout, Using a Durable Power of Attorney to Make Gifts for an Incapacitated Prin-
cipal, 15 EST. PLAN. 278 (1988); Note, Proxy Decisionmaking for the Terminally Ill: The Virgi-
nia Approach, 70 VA. L. REv. 1269 (1984). Durable powers have also been discussed from a
public policy perspective. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, SURROGATE DECISIONMAKtNG FOR
ADULTS: MODEL STANDARDS TO ENSURE QUALITY GUARDIANSHIP AND REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE-
SHIP SERVICES, H.R. COMM. PUB. No. 705, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. ONE-I to ONE-10 (1988)
[hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL REPORT].
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affairs in the event of future illness or incapacity.' Thus, the 1989 re-
forms offer little to those who are too poor to afford guardianship or
those who simply want to plan ahead.
Existing durable power law in Florida affords only a limited and
frequently unhelpful alternative to guardianship. Under a statute that
has remained largely unchanged since 1974, 4 a durable power of attor-
ney is valid in Florida only when given to a spouse or to one of several
specified persons related by birth or adoption,5 the so-called "durable
family power of attorney." ' 6 Florida is apparently the only state in the
nation that confines the durable power to this narrow group of rela-
tives. 7 As a result, any Floridian who desires to plan for a future inca-
pacity, and who lives a great distance from family members, is
estranged from them, or is unlucky enough to have no trustworthy
relatives, is left with no alternative but a guardianship.8
3. A durable power of attorney is "an instrument authorizing the person designated as
attorney-in-fact ...to act in the place of the principal [the person signing the instrument]."
Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, HB 1332 (1989) Staff Analysis I (original Apr. 4, 1989)
(on file with committee). A durable power of attorney continues in effect even after the subse-
quent disability of the person signing the instrument. Id. In effect, the "attorney in fact" be-
comes a special kind of agent of the person giving the durable power (the "principal"). The
attorney in fact is an agent who may transact business or handle other affairs on behalf of the
principal even if the principal becomes incapacitated. The "durable" nature of the power of
attorney is its outstanding feature, since a common law power of attorney, like any other princi-
pal-agent relationship, ceased to exist the moment the principal became incapacitated. See Stet-
son Note, supra note 2, at 165.
4. Compare FLA. STAT. § 709.08 (1) (1989) (allowing appointment of spouses, brothers,
sisters, nieces, nephews and any person related to the principal by lineal consanguinity, natural
or adopted) with id. § 709.08 (1) (1975) (which allowed appointment of only the spouse, parent
or child). Since its enactment in 1974, the statute has been amended only slightly to expand the
class of blood or marital relatives who may be donees of the durable power of attorney. See id. §
709.08(1) (1977) (brothers and sisters added); id. § 709.08(1) (1983) (nieces and nephews added);
id. § 709.08(1) (Supp. 1988) (all persons related by lineal consanguinity, whether natural or
adopted, added).
5. It remains possible that the courts, as a matter of state common law, could declare a
general durable power valid even if it did not fall within the requirements of the statute. This is
so because the durable "family" power of attorney statute does not expressly proscribe other
forms of durable powers. See id. § 709.08. However, this appears to be an unlikely avenue of
reform in light of the Supreme Court of Florida's reluctance to abrogate common law doctrines
that the Legislature has chosen to leave unchanged. See, e.g., Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics
v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986) (leaving to the Legislature the decision to overrule the
common law doctrine of necessaries, despite the court's acknowledgment that it is probably un-
constitutional).
6. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1) (1989) (allowing appointment of one's "spouse, brother, sister,
niece, nephew, or a person related to the principal by lineal consanguinity, whether natural or
adopted").
7. Stetson Note, supra note 2, at 168.
8. Florida law does permit a few other very limited forms of surrogate decisionmaking.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.04 (1989) (permitting a living will). However, other than guardianship
and the durable family power of attorney, there are no general forms of surrogate decisionmak-
ing available in Florida.
522 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:519
This Article outlines the need to enact reforms that will provide a
more widely available and less expensive alternative and supplement
to guardianship. The Article begins by examining the history of dura-
ble power law. 9 It reviews other possible approaches to the question,
including statutes of other states 0 and two specific proposals for re-
form that failed in the 1989 Regular Session." Finally, the Article ex-
plores the inadequacies of these approaches and of current Florida
law, and concludes with a new proposal for reform. 2
I. HISTORY OF THE DURABLE POWER
Planning for illness or incapacity is one of the ways in which law-
yers, through preventive law, can best help clients with their personal
affairs. Without advance planning, there may be no one who can le-
gally act as a surrogate decisionmaker if a person is suddenly injured
or taken ill. Likewise, the lack of a clear-cut procedure for surrogate
decisionmaking may cause disharmony among members of an inca-
pacitated person's family. Disputes among family members sometimes
originate during the serious illness of one of their members, and often
involve decisions about care, treatment, and control of assets.
A. Development of the "Durable" Power of Attorney
Guardianship is one possible means of solving such problems. Un-
der settled common law doctrines now embodied in Florida statutory
law, 13 a guardian has unquestioned authority to engage in surrogate
decisionmaking on behalf of the incapacitated "ward.' 4 Indeed, the
guardian's authority over the ward can be plenary, covering almost all
possible business and personal matters." Accordingly, the relationship
of guardian to ward is much like that of parent to child: The former
has unquestioned power to make decisions for the latter.1 6
Nevertheless, guardianship has significant limitations when applied
to planning for illness or incapacity. For example, a guardianship nec-
essarily strips the ward of some or all decision-making capacity.' 7
9. See infra notes 13-68 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 23-68 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 69-102 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
13. Ch. 89-96, 1989 Fla. Laws 173 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 744.101-.709 (1989)).
14. Id. § 4, 1989 Fla. Laws at 177-79 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.102(10), (17) (1989)); see
also id. § 74, 1989 Fla. Laws at 210 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.444 (1989)).
15. Id. § 4, 1989 Fla. Laws at 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.102(8)(b) (1989)) (defining
"plenary guardian"); id. § 74, 1989 Fla. Laws at 210 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.444 (1989)).
16. See, e.g., id. § 74, 1989 Fla. Laws at 210 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.444 (1989)).
17. See id. § 4, 1989 Fla. Laws at 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.102(8)(b) (1989)); id. §
74, 1989 Fla. Laws at 210 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.444 (1989)).
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Thus, the ward has little or no ability to control the lawful acts of the
guardian. Another serious shortcoming is the necessity of filing a peti-
tion and of undergoing a formal court hearing, since a guardianship
can be created only by a court."8 In the case of an emergency, guardi-
anship may be a cumbersome remedy at best. The requirement of a
court hearing often means that a guardianship cannot be created in
time to meet the immediate needs of one who is unexpectedly injured
or incapacitated. 9
Prior to the 1970s, most common law jurisdictions recognized just
one general form of surrogate decisionmaking other than guardian-
ship. Under this earlier law, a person (the "principal") could appoint
someone else (the "agent") to act and make decisions on the person's
behalf. This particularly was true of a type of agent called an "attor-
ney in fact" who, in a document called a "power of attorney," was
authorized to act in the place of the principal. 20 The power included
authority to sign binding legal documents and enter into contracts on
behalf of the principal. Unlike the relationship of ward and guardian,
the principal continued to exercise complete control over the acts of
the attorney in fact. 21 Thus, an "agency" relationship gave the princi-
pal wide latitude to direct the activities of the agent.
Nevertheless, a common-law power of attorney was useless as a
method of surrogate decisionmaking in the event of an incapacitating
illness or injury because, under the common law, the agent's authority
ceased to exist as soon as the principal became incapacitated. 22 Even if
the principal wanted the agent to continue making decisions, the com-
mon law proscribed any such authority. Thus, guardianship was the
only workable means of surrogate decisionmaking for one who was
either incapacitated or expected to become incapacitated, because it
was the only form of surrogacy that was "durable."
18. Id. § 33, 1989 Fla. Laws at 190 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.3201 (1989)); id. § 35, 1989
Fla. Laws at 192-95 (amending FLA. STAT. § 744.331 (1987)); id. § 38, 1989 Fla. Laws at 195-96
(amending FLA. STAT. § 744.341 (1987)).
19. See infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 118 (5th ed. 1979) defines "attorney in fact" as:
[a] private attorney authorized by another to act in his place and stead, either for
some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction of business in
general, not of a legal character. This authority is conferred by an instrument in writ-
ing, called a "letter of attorney," or more commonly a "power of attorney."
Id. As indicated in the definition, an attorney in fact is not the same thing as an attorney at law,
since the former need not be a legal practitioner. See id.
21. See, e.g., Oxford Lake Line v. First Nat'l Bank, 40 Fla. 349, 357-58, 24 So. 480, 483
(1898).
22. See, e.g., Millman v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 198 So. 2d 338, 340 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1967); Collin & Meyers, supra note 2, at 282; Stout, supra note 2, at 278; see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122(1) (1958).
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Recognizing the inherent limitations of guardianship, all fifty states
have adopted some form of nonjudicial alternative to guardianship
and common law powers of attorney. In the majority of jurisdictions,
these alternatives are simply called "durable" powers of attorney. Es-
sentially all of the alternatives are a variation of the common law the-
ory governing principals and agents, with the major exception being
that they are "durable," and therefore survive the principal's incapac-
ity.23 Those jurisdictions authorizing durable types of agencies thus
have created a legal hybrid that combines attributes of both common-
law agency and guardianship.
This statutory alteration of the common law is of recent vintage.
Most states did not adopt statutes authorizing this durable type of
agency until after 1969. In that year, the landmark Uniform Durable
Power of Attorney Act (Uniform Act) was promulgated by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Na-
tional Conference). 24 Apparently, the only state that had adopted a
durable form of agency before the promulgation of the Uniform Act
was Virginia, which had enacted such a statute nineteen years earlier
in 1950.25
The Uniform Act became the model for many jurisdictions. This
fact explains the strong influence of common-law agency theories on
statutes authorizing durable powers. Essentially, the Uniform Act's
five sections constitute an evolution of agency theory into a more flex-
ible form.
B. Scope of the Uniform Act
In its definitional section, the Uniform Act states that a durable
power of attorney is simply a common-law power of attorney that
continues in effect after the disability or incapacity of the principal. 26
A separate section makes this definition operative by providing that
23. See Collin & Meyers, supra note 2, at 282; Stout, supra note 2, at 278.
24. Prefatory Note to UNti'. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT, 8 U.L.A. 511, 511-12
(1983).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 103 (Supp. 1989). This section provides that:
[a] durable power of attorney is a power of attorney by which a principal designates
another his attorney in fact in writing and the writing contains the words "This power
of attorney shall not be affected by subsequent disability or incapacity of the princi-
pal, or lapse of time," or "This power of attorney shall become effective upon the
disability or incapacity of the principal," or similar words showing the intent of the
principal that the authority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the princi-
pal's subsequent disability or incapacity, and, unless it states a time of termination,
notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution of the instrument.
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all acts performed by the attorney in fact during the disability or inca-
pacity of the principal will be treated as if performed by the princi-
pal. 27
There are no limitations on who may be given the durable power,
and there are no restrictions on the kinds of decisionmaking that
might be delegated. As a result, the Uniform Act apparently applies
equally to every form of decisionmaking, whether it involves personal,
business, or medical concerns. It is significant that the National Con-
ference has never attempted to address separately any particular issues
that might be raised by surrogate health care decisionmaking. 28
The remaining provisions of the Uniform Act do nothing more than
specify methods of revocation and define the relationship of the attor-
ney in fact to court-appointed fiduciaries of the principal. With re-
spect to revocation, the Uniform Act states only that a durable power
is not revoked by the death of the principal unless the attorney in fact
has actual knowledge of the principal's death or otherwise fails to act
in good faith. 29 The Uniform Act then provides a specific method for
proving that a durable power has not been revoked.30 This proof is
27. Id. § 5-502. This section provides that:
[ajll acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during
any period of disability or incapacity of the principal have the same effect and inure to
the benefit of and bind the principal and his successors in interest as if the principal
were competent and not disabled. Unless the instrument states a time of termination,
the power is exercisable notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution of the
instrument.
Id.
28. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
29. UNIF. DURABxLE POWER OF ArroR.NEy ACT § 5-504, 8 U.L.A. 516 (1983). The section
provides that:
(a) The death of a principal who has executed a written power of attorney, durable
or otherwise, does not revoke or terminate the agency as to the attorney in fact or
other person, who, without actual knowledge of the death of the principal, acts in
good faith under the power. Any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid or unen-
forceable, binds successors in interest of the principal.
(b) The disability or incapacity of a principal who has previously executed a written
power of attorney that is not a durable power does not revoke or terminate the agency
as to the attorney in fact or other person, who, without actual knowledge of the disa-
bility or incapacity of the principal, acts in good faith under the power. Any action so
taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds the principal and his succes-
sors in interest.
Id.
30. Id. § 5-505, 8 U.L.A. 517-18. This section provides that:
[A]s to acts undertaken in good faith reliance thereon, an affidavit executed by the
attorney in fact under a power of attorney, durable or otherwise, stating that he did
not have at the time of exercise of the power actual knowledge of the termination of
the power by revocation or of the principal's death, disability, or incapacity is conclu-
sive proof of the nonrevocation or nontermination of the power at that time. If the
exercise of the power of attorney requires execution and delivery of any instrument
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accomplished when the attorney in fact executes an affidavit stating
that, at the time of the act in question, he had no actual knowledge
that the power had been revoked or terminated. Such an affidavit pro-
vides conclusive proof that the power was not revoked."
Finally, the Uniform Act recognizes that the attorney in fact is ac-
countable to guardians and to other court-appointed fiduciaries in the
same manner as would be the principal.12 Thus, the creation of a
guardianship does not, standing alone, revoke the durable power, al-
though the guardian may terminate the power at will. 3 This feature
implicitly recognizes that a durable power need not be considered in-
consistent with a guardianship and may even supplement it. As a re-
sult, a guardian would be free to continue to use the services of an
attorney in fact who was previously appointed by the principal. No
other issues regarding revocation of durable powers are addressed by
the Uniform Act.34 Most significantly, the Uniform Act does not deal
with the potential problems that might arise when a principal attempts
to revoke a durable power. Disputes might arise, for example, regard-
ing the exact time of revocation. Similarly, the Uniform Act provides
no way of proving whether revocation has occurred. As a result, third
parties are left to guess as to the validity of a durable power and to
risk a loss if the durable power is proven to have been revoked.
C. Health Care Surrogacy
As noted above,35 one of the major problems left unaddressed by
the Uniform Act is surrogate decisionmaking for health care pur-
that is recordable, the affidavit when authenticated for record is likewise recordable.
This section does not affect any provision in a power of attorney for its termination
by expiration of time or occurrence of an event other than express revocation or a
change in the principal's capacity.
Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 5-503, 8 U.L.A. 514-15. This section provides that:
(a) If, following execution of a durable power of attorney, a court of the principal's
domicile appoints a conservator, guardian of the estate, or other fiduciary charged
with the management of all of the principal's property or all of his property except
specified exclusions, the attorney in fact is accountable to the fiduciary as well as to
the principal. The fiduciary has the same power to revoke or amend the power of
attorney that the principal would have had if he were not disabled or incapacitated.
(b) A principal may nominate, by a durable power of attorney, the conservator,
guardian of his estate, or guardian of his person for consideration by the court if
protective proceedings for the principal's person or estate are thereafter commenced.
The court shall make its appointment in accordance with the principal's most recent
nomination in a durable power of attorney except for good cause or disqualification.
Id.
33. Id.
34. The Uniform Act also addresses the revocation of nondurable common-law powers of
attorney by disability or incapacity of the principal. See id. § 5-504(b), 8 U.L.A. 516.
35. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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poses. The Uniform Act ignores the issue, apparently leaving health
care decisionmaking to be governed by the same standards that govern
durable powers in general. Some jurisdictions have found this ap-
proach unsatisfactory and have developed special guidelines for health
care decisionmaking. 36
The primary reason for this variation from the Uniform Act is that
surrogate health care decisions involve unique issues involving the life
and well-being of the principal. In some instances, a health care surro-
gate might be asked to make decisions that could result in the death of
the principal. Also, some types of medical procedures justifiably may
be regarded as so extreme as to be unfit for consideration by anyone
other than the principal or a guardian.
California, reacting to these concerns, not only adopted the Uni-
form Act3 7 but also created a completely separate act to govern health
care decisionmaking (California Health Care Act). 38 The form of sur-
rogate decisionmaking authorized by the latter is called a "durable
power of attorney for health care." 3 9 The particular requirements of
the California Health Care Act reveal several special concerns that
distinguish surrogate health care decisionmaking from durable powers
in general.
First, the attorney in fact cannot make "health care decisions" un-
less the durable power of attorney specifically delegates this power. As
a result, even a plenary durable power of attorney is insufficient to
authorize surrogate health care decisionmaking unless it does so ex-
pressly. 4° This reflects a determination that surrogate health care deci-
sionmaking should not be deemed authorized by implication,
especially when a principal did not intend this result.
Second, the California Health Care Act limits the class of persons
who may act as witnesses to the execution of a durable power of attor-
ney for health care. Witnesses cannot include the attorney in fact and
certain kinds of health care providers. 4 1 In addition, at least one of the
36. Rhoden, supra note 2, at 433 n.255 (California, Colorado, Nevada, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania & Rhode Island each have a statute specifically authorizing surrogate health care
decisionmaking).
37. CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 2400-2407 (West Supp. 1989).
38. Id. §§ 2430-2444.
39. Id. § 2430(a).
40. Id. § 2432(a). The statute provides that:
(a) An attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney may not make health care
decisions unless all of the following requirements are satisfied:
(1) The durable power of attorney specifically authorizes the attorney in fact to
make health care decisions ....
Id.
41. Id. § 2432(d). The statute provides that:
1990]
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witnesses must not be related by blood, marriage, or adoption to the
principal, nor entitled to any part of the principal's estate.4 2
Third, the California Health Care Act also limits the potential class
of attorneys in fact who may make surrogate health care decisions.
This class may not include the treating health care providers, their em-
ployees, or employees of certain residential facilities, unless these per-
sons are related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption. 43 It
(d) None of the following may be used as a witness under subdivision (a):
(1) A health care provider.
(2) An employee of a health care provider.
(3) The attorney in fact.
(4) The operator of a community care facility.
(5) An employee of an operator of a community care facility.
(6) The operator of a residential care facility for the elderly.
(7) An employee of an operator of a residential care facility for the elderly.
Id.
42. Id. § 2432(a), (e). The statute provides in pertinent part that:
(a) An attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney may not make health care
decisions unless all of the following requirements are satisfied:
(3) The durable power of attorney is witnessed by one of the following methods:
(A) The durable power of attorney is signed by at least two witnesses each of whom
witnessed either the signing of the instrument by the principal or the principal's ack-
nowledgment of the signature or of the instrument, each witness making the following
declaration in substance: "I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of Cali-
fornia that the person who signed or acknowledged this document is personally known
to me to be the principal, that the principal signed or acknowledged this durable
power of attorney in my presence, that the principal appears to be of sound mind and
under no duress, fraud, or undue influence, that I am not the person appointed as
attorney in fact by this document, and that I am not a health care provider, an em-
ployee of a health care provider, the operator of a community care facility, an em-
ployee of an operator of a community care facility, the operator of a residential care
facility for the elderly, nor an employee of an operator of a residential care facility for
the elderly." At least one of the witnesses must also have signed the following declara-
tion: "I further declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that I
am not related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, and, to the best of
my knowledge, I am not entitled to any part of the estate of the principal upon the
death of the principal under a will now existing or by operation of law."
(e) At least one of the persons used as a witness under subdivision (a) shall be a
person who is not one of the following:
(1) A relative of the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption.
(2) A person who would be entitled to any portion of the estate of the principal
upon his or her death under any will or codicil thereto of the principal existing at the
time of execution of the durable power of attorney or by operation of law then exist-
ing.
Id.
43. Id. § 2432.5. The statute provides that:
An employee of the treating health care provider or an employee of an operator of a
community care facility or an employee of a residential care facility for the elderly
may be designated as the attorney in fact to make health care decisions under a dura-
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is unclear why an exception was allowed for relatives, since a treating
health care provider who is both the attorney in fact and a relative of
the principal could be deemed to have a substantial conflict of inter-
est.
Fourth, attorneys in fact acting under a California durable power
of attorney for health care cannot authorize certain drastic medical
procedures. These include commitment to a mental health treatment
facility, convulsive or electroshock therapy, certain types of brain sur-
gery, sterilization, abortion," or euthanasia. 45 This requirement re-
flects a belief that some drastic procedures are not proper even for a
surrogate to authorize, but should be left until such time as the princi-
pal is competent.
Another major limitation on surrogate health care decisionmaking
involves methods of revocation. The California Health Care Act cre-
ates a presumption that a principal can revoke a durable power of
attorney for health care at any time,4 even if the revocation is oral.47
This reflects a belief that any attempt by the principal to revoke a
durable power of attorney for health care must be afforded the bene-
fit of the doubt.
Finally, the California statute expressly provides for certain types of
court hearings involving both general durable powers and durable
ble power of attorney if (a) the employee so designated is a relative of the principal by
blood, marriage, or adoption, and (b) the other requirements of this article are satis-
fied.
Id.
44. Id. § 2435. The statute provides that:
A durable power of attorney may not authorize the attorney in fact to consent to any
of the following on behalf of the principal:
(a) Commitment to or placement in a mental health treatment facility.
(b) Convulsive treatment (as defined in Section 5325 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code).
(c) Psychosurgery (as defined in Section 5325 of the Welfare and Institutions Code).
(d) Sterilization.
(e) Abortion.
Id.
45. Id. § 2443. The statute provides that:
Nothing in this article shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy
killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other
than the withholding or withdrawal of health care pursuant to a durable power of
attorney for health care so as to permit the natural process of dying. In making health
care decisions under a durable power of attorney for health care, an attempted suicide
by the principal shall not be construed to indicate a desire of the principal that health
care treatment be restricted or inhibited.
Id.
46. Id. § 2437(c). The statute provides that "[i]t is presumed that the principal has the
capacity to revoke a durable power of attorney for health care. This presumption is a presump-
tion affecting the burden of proof." Id.
47. Id. § 2437(a).
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powers of attorney for health care. Persons who may bring a petition
in court are named in the statute, and include the principal, the attor-
ney in fact, guardians of the principal, and certain family members
and potential heirs of the principal. 48 As to general durable powers,
the statute allows a court to hear disputes about termination of pow-
ers, the acts of the attorney in fact, and the failure of the attorney in
fact to account for his acts.4 9 Similar judicial review is provided for
acts of attorneys in fact for health care, except that the court also is
empowered to consider the desires of the principal in reaching its deci-
sions.5 0
48. Id.§ 2411.
49. Id. § 2412. The statute provides that:
Except as provided in Section 2412.5 [quoted infra note 50], a petition may be filed
under this article for any one or more of the following purposes:
(a) Determining whether the power of attorney is in effect or has terminated.
(b) Passing on the acts or proposed acts of the attorney in fact.
(c) Compelling the attorney in fact to submit his or her accounts or report his or her
acts as attorney in fact to the principal, the spouse of the principal, the conservator of
the person or the estate of the principal, or to such other person as the court in its
discretion may require, if the attorney in fact has failed to submit an accounting and
report within 60 days after written request from the person filing the petition.
(d) Declaring that the power of attorney is terminated upon a determination by the
court of all of the following:
(1) The attorney in fact has violated or is unfit to perform the fiduciary duties under
the power of attorney.
(2) At the time of the determination by the court, the principal lacks the capacity to
give or to revoke a power of attorney.
(3) The termination of the power of attorney is in the best interests of the principal
or the principal's estate.
Id.
50. Id. § 2412.5. The statute provides that:
With respect to a durable power of attorney for health care, a petition may be filed
under this article for any one or more of the following purposes:
(a) Determining whether the durable power of attorney for health care is in effect or
has terminated.
(b) Determining whether the acts or proposed acts of the attorney in fact are consis-
tent with the desires of the principal as expressed in the durable power of attorney or
otherwise made known to the court or, where the desires of the principal are unknown
or unclear, whether the acts or proposed acts of the attorney in fact are in the best
interests of the principal.
(c) Compelling the attorney in fact to report his or her acts as attorney in fact to the
principal, the spouse of the principal, the conservator of the person of the prinicpal,
or to any other person as the court in its discretion may require, if the attorney in fact
has failed to submit such a report within 10 days after written request from the person
filing the petition.
(d) Declaring that the durable power of attorney for health care is terminated upon
a determination by the court that the attorney in fact has made a health care decision
for the principal that authorized anything illegal or upon a determination by the court
of both of the following:
(1) The attorney in fact has violated, has failed to perform, or is unfit to perform,
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Taken as a whole, the California Health Care Act suggests one of
the serious limitations of the Uniform Act. Specifically, procedures
that may be adequate to regulate surrogate decisionmaking in business
and other workaday matters may not be appropriate for health care.
Indeed, society rightfully must question whether certain drastic types
of medical procedures, such as sterilization, should ever be authorized
by a surrogate. Even routine medical procedures may be very risky to
the principal. If so, society has a definite interest in seeing that the
principal has every opportunity to limit or revoke a durable power
that authorizes such procedures. The Uniform Act fails to appreciate
these problems.
D. Florida Durable "'Family" Power of Attorney
Florida has done no better. In fact, the state's current durable
power statute, first adopted in 1974,1 shows both the heavy influence
and shortcomings of the Uniform Act. The Florida statute tracks
much of the operative language of the Uniform Act. For example, it
provides that the power is exercisable notwithstanding disability or in-
capacity of the principal.52 Like the Uniform Act, the Florida statute
does not provide a reliable method of proving whether a durable
power of attorney has been revoked, thus encouraging needless litiga-
tion on this question.
the duty under the durable power of attorney for health care to act consistent with the
desires of the principal or, where the desires of the principal are unknown or unclear,
is acting (by action or inaction) in a manner that is clearly contrary to the best inter-
ests of the principal.
(2) At the time of the determination by the court, the principal lacks the capacity to
give or to revoke a durable power of attorney for health care.
Id.
51. FLA. STAT. § 709.08 (1975). This statute has been amended to broaden the class of
relatives who may be appointed attorneys in fact. See supra note 4.
52. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1) (1989). The statute provides in pertinent part that:
(1) A principal may create a durable family power of attorney designating his
spouse, brother, sister, niece, nephew, or a person related to the principal by lineal
consanguinity, whether natural or adopted, as his attorney in fact by executing a
power of attorney. Such power of attorney shall be in writing, shall state the relation-
ship of the parties, and shall include the words, "This durable family power of attor-
ney shall not be affected by disability of the principal except as provided by statute"
or similar words clearly showing the intent of the principal that the power conferred
on the attorney in fact shall be exercisable from the date specified in the instrument,
notwithstanding a later disability or incapacity of the principal, unless otherwise pro-
vided by statute. All acts done by the attorney in fact pursuant to the power conferred
during any period of disability or incompetence shall have the same effect, and inure
to the benefit of and bind the principal or his heirs, devisees, and personal representa-
tives, as if the principal were competent and not disabled.
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Nor does the Florida statute address the special problems associated
with health care decisionmaking. It leaves unsettled the question of
whether surrogate health care decisionmaking falls within its provi-
sions. One Florida case, however, suggests that the durable "family"
power of attorney grants authority to perform "the same functions as
would a court appointed guardian. 5 3 This implies that the durable
"family" power is broad enough to include health care surrogacy.
Nevertheless, the Florida statute differs in several major respects
from both the Uniform Act and the California Health Care Act. For
example, the Florida statute specifically requires that the durable
power is nondelegable, is revoked by an adjudication of incompe-
tency, and is suspended when a petition to determine competency of
the principal is filed.14 This feature, which is the only provision for
judicial review in the statute, opens the possibility that anyone who
disagrees with the exercise of the durable power by the attorney in fact
can nullify the durable power simply by filing a petition for involun-
tary guardianship. As a result, the Florida statute may encourage liti-
gation among family members or others who are squabbling over
control of assets or health care decisionmaking.
In addition, the Florida durable family power of attorney can never
be a supplement to guardianship. This is because the court's adjudica-
tion of incompetence" or incapacity automatically revokes the power.
The durable power cannot then be reinstated unless the principal is
adjudged competent or unless the court approves a temporary rein-
statement for "emergencies. 5 6 Under this approach, Florida heavily
53. See In re Estate of Schriver, 441 So. 2d 1105, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). However, this
statement is dicta. See id.
54. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(2) (1989). The statute provides that:
(2) The durable family power of attorney shall be nondelegable and shall be valid
until such time as the donor shall die, revoke the power, or be adjudged incompetent.
At any time a petition to determine competency of the donor or a petition to appoint a
guardian for the donor has been filed, the durable family power of attorney shall be
temporarily suspended. Notice of the pending petition shall be given to all known
donees of the power. The power shall remain suspended until the petition is dismissed,
withdrawn, or the donor is adjudged competent, at which time the power shall be
automatically reinstated and any exercise of the power shall be valid. If the donor is
adjudged incompetent, the power shall be automatically revoked.
Id.
55. This term has been replaced with the term "incapacitated" in the 1989 guardianship
reforms. See ch. 89-96, 1989 Fla. Laws 173.
56. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(4) (1989). The statute provides that:
(4) Whenever an emergency arises between the time a petition is filed and an adjudi-
cation is made regarding the competency of the donor, the donee of the durable fam-
ily power of attorney may petition the court for permission to exercise the power. The
petition shall specify the emergency, the property involved, and the proposed action of
the donee. No exercise of the power by the donee during this time period shall be valid
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favors guardianship by making it preeminent over the durable family
power of attorney and by viewing the two as mutually inconsistent. As
the Uniform Act recognized, this need not be the case.
While the Uniform Act specifically authorizes durable powers that
do not take effect until incapacity, 7 the Florida statute is silent on this
subject.5" Thus, it is unclear whether a contingent or "springing"
power of attorney-one that takes effect upon a future contingency-
is authorized in Florida. 9 If not, the attractiveness of the durable
"family" power of attorney is greatly diminished. Many Floridians
may be unwilling to execute a durable power that grants immediate
authority to the attorney in fact.
As noted earlier, 6w however, the most troubling restriction of the
Florida statute is that the durable power can be granted only to spe-
cific family members. In the 1974 version of the statute, these were a
"spouse, parent or child, whether natural or adopted, ' 61 of the princi-
pal. Over the years this list gradually has been expanded to include the
principal's "spouse, brother, sister, niece, nephew, or a person related
to the principal by lineal consanguinity, whether natural or
adopted. ' 62 Thus, Florida residents are restricted to a handful of rela-
tives as their potential choices for surrogate decisionmakers.
The reasons for this restriction are unclear in light of Florida's
needs. Florida has one of the largest populations of elderly retirees in
the nation, and health care providers frequently must deal with unex-
pected emergencies involving an unconscious patient whose family
members live far away. For example, one injured Florida resident re-
mained untreated at a hospital for seven hours until a court appointed
a guardian for him, because no relative could be found to consent to
treatment. 63 Many health care providers have complained of similar
instances and have urged the Legislature to give Florida residents
greater freedom to appoint surrogates in an emergency. 64
The problem is not confined merely to the elderly. Anyone who is
suddenly taken ill, or who cannot rely on family members in an emer-
without the permission of the court.
Id.
57. UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 511 (Supp. 1989).
58. See Stetson Note, supra note 2, at 174 (noting :his fact).
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
61. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1) (1975).
62. Id. § 709.08(1) (1989).
63. Law-abiding Doctors Leave Man Untreated, St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at 2B,
col. 1.
64. E.g., letter from Michael A. Bernstein of Gulf Coast Jewish Family Service, Inc., to
Rep. Elaine Gordon (Apr. 4, 1989) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Rec-
ord Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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gency, may be left with no surrogate to grant consent for treatment.
For example, Florida has the third highest number of people with Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the United States. 65
Many of these men and women are estranged from their families or
live far away from them. 6 Florida law thus denies these people the
opportunity to designate a surrogate decisionmaker through a durable
power. 67 For Floridians who have no family members upon whom to
depend, the only possible alternative is guardianship.6
II. PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM IN FLORIDA
Yet, as states like California have recognized, guardianship is not
always the best vehicle for surrogate decisionmaking, whether for the
ill or the elderly. One congressional committee studying the problem
concluded that guardianship is overused, expensive, and often too re-
strictive of individual rights.69 In support of this proposition, the con-
gressional committee cited numerous instances in which guardians
bilked their wards out of assets, mistreated them, or subjected them to
gross neglect.70
65. Waters, Florida's Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 441, 444 n.2
(1988).
66. Letter from Ginny Robson, Tallahassee AIDS Support Services, Inc. (TASS), to Craig
Waters (July 18, 1989) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Manage-
ment, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). Robson stated that TASS, which provides volun-
teer and publicly-funded services to people with AIDS, has encountered instances of
estrangement from family members:
TASS has found that, in some instances, a family will abandon its relative who is
infected with HIV. In these cases, finding a family member willing to make decisions
for the client is difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, if a relative is found
who will serve in this capacity, his/her reluctance to do so surely affects decisions
made on behalf of the patient ....
Conversely, family systems reacting to knowledge about HIV status, and possibly
about sexual preference and drug use, may result in the family denying the patient
support from those established in his/her support network, i.e. roommates, lovers,
friends, etc. While these people may be the best equipped to act on behalf of the
patient, [current] restrictions make this impossible.
Because of the issues outlined above, creating a durable power of attorney that al-
lows for the designation of non-family members is considered to be a critical step
forward in the humane response to AIDS that Florida needs to take.
Id.
67. See id.
68. This is in contrast to states like California. For instance, a study of people with AIDS in
San Francisco showed that 42% had executed a durable power of attorney for health care in
favor of their life partner, a friend, or other non-relative. Rhoden, supra note 2, at 437 n.271
(1988) (citing Steinbrook, Lo, Moulton, Saika, Holland & Volberding, Preferences of Homosex,-
ual Men with AIDS for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 457 (1986)).
69. CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 2, at One-l to One-10.
70. Id. at One-I to One-2.
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The opportunity for this type of corruption is enhanced by the pre-
eminence of the guardian over the ward. As a result, the committee
concluded that these abuses indicate the need for increased reliance on
alternatives such as the durable power of attorney, which "provide[]
the greatest assurance of fulfillment of one's wishes beyond incapacity
and, in many situations, obviate[] the need to ever resort to guardian-
ship."71
Indeed, the 1989 Florida guardianship reforms were prompted by
the inadequacy of traditional forms of surrogate decisionmaking. The
new "limited guardianship" concept embodied in the reforms rests on
the common sense belief that a person's incapacity often does not af-
fect every aspect of life.72 Thus, the ward may be unable to manage
business affairs but completely capable of making health care deci-
sions. Recognizing such possibilities, the new limited guardianship
concept authorizes a court to limit the guardian's power to those spe-
cific matters the incapacitated person is unable to handle. 73
Yet even this form of surrogate decisionmaking may not be entirely
satisfactory in all situations. Limited guardianship itself strips the
ward of significant powers. In particular, the ward is unable to exer-
cise much control over the lawful activities of the limited guardian.
The guardian can make binding decisions within the confines of the
guardianship order, and the ward has little or no veto power. 74 To the
extent of the limited guardian's powers, the ward is in much the same
situation as a child dependent upon the decisionmaking of the parent.
Thus, although limited guardianship has an unquestioned role in
planning for incapacity, it fails to recognize that a person's incapacity
sometimes does not entirely diminish the ability to participate in deci-
sionmaking or to express desires to a surrogate decisionmaker. If so,
there is no reason why the law should discourage the person from di-
recting the actions of the surrogate just as a principal directs an agent.
Hence one way of further respecting the rights of those who are par-
tially incapacitated is by giving them a say in decisionmaking. Yet this
is precisely what current law denies to the residents of Florida.
A. The 1989 Proposals for Reform
The problem outlined in this Article has not gone unnoticed by the
Legislature. In 1989, two separate proposals were introduced-one
71. Id. at One-19.
72. See ch. 89-96, § 3, 1989 Fla. Laws 173, 177 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.102(8)(a)
(1989)) (defining "limited guardian"); id. § 35, 1989 Fla. Laws at 194 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
744.331(5) (1989)) (requiring the court to determine extent of incapacity and limited guardian-
ship accordingly).
73. See id. § 35, 1989 Fla. Laws at 192-95.
74. See id. § 35, 1989 Fla. Laws at 194 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.331(5) (1989)).
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dealing with durable powers in general75 and the other dealing with a
limited durable power of attorney for health care76 -that would have
created new and more flexible forms of surrogate decisionmaking,
similar to those existing in California. Both failed to emerge from the
1989 Regular Session.
The first of these proposals was House Bill 1332 (Trammell Bill),
introduced by Representative Robert Trammell. 77 The Trammell Bill
would have expanded the class of persons who could be appointed
attorney in fact to include non-family members and corporations. 78
This feature of the Trammell Bill thus solved the chief problem caused
by current Florida law: the restriction of the potential class to family
members.7 9 By authorizing the appointment of all persons, the Tram-
mell Bill would have expanded current law to meet the needs of per-
sons who are estranged from or distant to their families.
Another feature of the Trammell Bill was designed to address a ma-
jor shortcoming of the Uniform Act: the difficulty of verifying
whether a durable power is still valid. Under the Trammell Bill, a
Florida durable power of attorney would have become valid only by
being recorded in the county courthouse, 0 and revocation would have
been perfected against a third party only by a similar recordation."
This provision of the Trammell Bill would have given third parties a
reliable and easily accessible means of determining the validity of a
durable power, simply by checking the courthouse records. As a re-
sult, the Trammell Bill might have diminished the unwillingness of
some third parties to honor durable powers. It also would have re-
duced the likelihood of lawsuits over the use of durable powers, since
the date of validity or of revocation would be a matter of public
record.
The Trammell Bill had another major feature: unlike current Flor-
ida law,8 2 the Bill would have recognized durable powers as a possible
supplement to guardianship. 3 The current power of attorney statute
states that the attorney in fact ceases to have authority to act as soon
as the principal is declared incompetent. 4 The Trammell Bill would
75. Fla. HB 1332 (1989).
76. Fla. CS for SB 900 (1989); Fla, CS for HB 1135 (1989).
77. Dem., Marianna.
78. Fla. HB 1332, § 1 (1989).
79. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1) (1989).
80. Fla. HB 1332, § 1 (1989).
81. Id.
82. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(2) (1989).
83. See Fla. HB 1332, § 1 (1989).
84. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(2) (1989).
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have allowed the durable power to continue after the creation of a
guardianship, but would have authorized the guardian to revoke the
durable power.85 In this way, a guardian could have continued to em-
ploy the attorney in fact to assist in providing services to the ward.
The second of the proposals that failed in 1989, originally intro-
duced by Representative Elaine Gordon 6 and Senator Jeanne
Malchon 7 (the "Gordon-Malchon proposal"), would have created a
form of health care surrogacy in Florida. 8  This proposal would have
authorized the designation of a "health care surrogate" to make
health care decisions for an incapacitated principal. The health care
surrogate could have been any competent adult except treating health
care providers, their employees, employees of a health care facility in
which the patient resided, or guardians of the principal's property.89
In addition, the health care surrogate would have been able to make
health care decisions for the principal only if a special three-member
committee certified that the principal was incapacitated. 9 A health
care surrogate also would not have been permitted to authorize abor-
tion, sterilization, electroshock therapy, psychosurgery, experimental
treatments and therapies, or voluntary admission to a mental health
facility. 91
The overall thrust of the Gordon-Malchon proposal was similar to
the California statute authorizing "durable powers of attorney for
health care." ' 92 Both authorized surrogate health care decisionmaking
but recognized that restrictions should apply to this area that do not
apply to durable powers of attorney in general. This is in keeping with
the special concerns associated with health care. 93 Unlike other dura-
ble powers, health care surrogacy might involve decisions affecting a
person's health and longevity. Thus, the State has a legitimate interest
in attaching special restrictions to the exercise of this form of surro-
gacy, just as the State has an interest in ensuring the proper adminis-
tration of health care.
85. Fla. HB 1332, § 1 (1989).
86. Dem., North Miami.
87. Dem., St. Petersburg.
88. Fla. CS for HB 1135 (1989); Fla. CS for SB 900 (1989).
89. Fla. CS for HB 1135, § 3(5) (1989); Fla. CS for SB 900, § 3(5) (1989).
90. The committee would consist of the attending physician, a psychiatrist not associated
with the attending physician and "a responsible citizen." Fla. CS for HB 1135, § 5 (1989); Fla.
CS for SB 900, § 5 (1989).
91. Fla. CS for HB 1135, § 7 (1989); Fla. CS for SB 900, § 7 (1989).
92. Fla. CS for HB 62 (1989); Fla. CS for HB 1087 (1989); Fla. CS for HB 1332 (1989);
CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 2430-2449 (West Supp. 1989).
93. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2432(d) (West Supp. 1989).
19901
538 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:519
The legislative history is unclear as to why both of these proposals
failed in 1989. The Trammell Bill actually was added to the guardian-
ship bill approved by the House of Representatives, 9 but the Senate
never concurred in this amendment. 95 Because the final version of the
guardianship bill was from the Senate, Trammell's proposal failed to
reach the Govenor's desk. 96 The Gordon-Malchon proposal never
emerged from committee in the House of Representatives or the Sen-
ate. Thus, it never was aired before either of the legislative houses.
B. Shortcomings of the 1989 Proposals
The proposals that failed in 1989, on the whole, would have been
substantial improvements over current Florida law. The Trammell Bill
in particular would have made durable powers available to all Florida
residents and simultaneously would have eliminated some of the most
vexing problems associated with the Uniform Act. In particular, the
Trammell bill would have provided an easy, relatively inexpensive
method of confirming the validity of durable powers: a quick check in
the county courthouse records. This provision could have eliminated
most problems associated with determining whether durable powers
have been revoked.
If there was any shortcoming at all, it was that the Trammell Bill,
like the Uniform Act, did not specifically address the question of
health care surrogacy. The question remains whether a durable power
under the Trammell Bill could ever encompass health care decision-
making. Presumably it could, since the courts in dicta have construed
the current durable "family" power of attorney to include any powers
a guardian might have, 97 which can include health care decisionmak-
ing. The courts have reached this broad conclusion despite the current
statute's failure to mention health care issues.
However, the courts might have construed the Gordon-Malchon
proposal as an exception to the Trammell Bill if both of the proposals
discussed here had passed in 1989. This would have been based on the
settled rule of statutory construction that a specific bill will be deemed
an exception to a general one if there are any inconsistencies. 98 Yet
such a construction would have resulted in some serious anomalies.
For instance, the Trammell Bill would have required that a durable
power of attorney be filed in the courthouse records, 99 but the Gor-
94. Fla. CS for HB 62 (1989); Fla. CS for HB 1087 (1989); Fla. CS for HB 1332 (1989).
95. See Fla. CS for CS for SB 1305 (1989).
96. See ch. 89-96, 1989 Fla. Laws 173 (1989).
97. In re Estate of Schriver, 441 So. 2d 1105, 1106-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
98. See, e.g., Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959).
99. Fla. HB 1332, § 1 (1989).
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don-Malchon proposal would have established no similar requirement
for health care surrogacy.10° The reason for this difference, if any, is
not clear. A courthouse filing requirement would have provided hos-
pitals and health care providers a quick and easy method of verifying
the validity of a health care surrogacy. Under the Gordon-Malchon
proposal, the hospital may well have been left to guess on this ques-
tion, or else to rely on the representations of the patient or the pa-
tient's friends or family.
In addition to this shortcoming, the Gordon-Malchon proposal es-
tablished a relatively cumbersome method of proving incapacity. Be-
fore a health care surrogacy could come into being, the approval of a
three-member committee consisting of the treating physician, a psy-
chiatrist or psychologist not associated with that physician, and a "re-
sponsible citizen" would have had to agree that the patient is
incapacitated.' 0 ' Futhermore, there was no provision for emergen-
cies. 02 As a result, a patient who was acutely in need of surrogate
decisionmaking simply might have had to wait until the committee
could convene.
The chief shortcoming of both of the 1989 proposals, however, was
their failure to appreciate that durable powers and health care surro-
gacy are really only two aspects of the same basic problem: how to
conduct surrogate decisionmaking. The state would be far better
served by a single, comprehensive statute. Most importantly, the basic
procedural and filing requirements for both durable powers and
health care surrogacy should be essentially the same. Variations are
needed only to address the special problems of health care surrogacy.
Such an approach will ensure that durable powers are better under-
stood and more easily executed by the public. This Article outlines a
proposal to achieve this result.
III. A NEW. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
The Proposal suggested by this Article is the basis of a Proposed
Florida Durable Power of Attorney Statute included in the Appendix
to this Article. This Proposal is a combination of the best features of
all the statutes and bills previously discussed. The Proposal also ad-
dresses some concerns not covered by any of these prior laws or bills.
100. See Fla. CS for HB 1135 (1989); see also Fla. CS for SB 900 (1989).
101. See Fla. CS for HB 1135 (1989); see also Fla. CS for SB 900 (1989).
102. See Fla. CS for HB 1135 (1989); see also Fla. CS for SB 900 (1989).
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A. Overview: Findings & Definitions
The general purpose of a durable power reform in Florida should
be to provide greater flexibility in nonjudicial surrogate decisionmak-
ing, just as the 1989 guardianship reforms now provide greater flexi-
bility in court ordered surrogacy. Thus, a comprehensive Florida
durable power statute should be based on explicit findings setting
forth this purpose and the groups who will benefit from the legisla-
tion. The elderly, the terminally ill, and persons wishing to make ade-
quate plans for the future would be better served by a general durable
power statute. Such a general statute would include, above all else, the
right to appoint any person as attorney in fact, whether a relative or
not. To effectuate this purpose, the legislature should provide that the
new statute be liberally construed by the courts to provide the greatest
benefit to the people.
In addition, the statutory findings should state, as did the Trammell
Bill,103 that durable powers are both an alternative and a supplement
to guardianship. Guardians should be authorized to supervise prior
durable powers and to appoint new attorneys in fact, if the need
arises. This is to do no more than authorize the guardian to appoint
deputies who then must operate under the procedural protections of
the new durable power statute.
B. Scope of the New Durable Power
The new durable power statute should implement the findings by
providing for a broad form of durable power, modeled in scope after
the Uniform Act.1°4 The statute should provide for both a plenary and
a limited form of durable power, much like the plenary and limited
forms of guardianship now available under the 1989 guardianship re-
forms. 05 In this way, the principal could delegate to the attorney in
fact all or some of the former's decisionmaking capability in the event
of illness or incapacity. This would greatly increase the flexibility of
the durable power by permitting principals to delegate only those mat-
ters most in need of surrogate decisionmaking.
In addition, like the Uniform Act,106 the new statute should allow a
durable power to be either "contingent"' 107 or "immediate." The for-
103. Fla. HB 1332, § 1 (1989).
104. See UNn'. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 103 (Supp. 1989).
105. See ch. 89-96, § 4, 1989 Fla. Laws 173, 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.102(8) (1989))
(defining "limited" and "plenary" guardianship).
106. UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 103 (Supp. 1989).
107. A "contingent" durable power is also called a "springing" durable power. Stetson
Note, supra note 2, at 174.
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mer would allow the durable power to take effect upon a future con-
tingency, such as the incapacity of the principal. The latter would
allow the durable power to take effect immediately, allowing the at-
torney in fact to act as the principal's agent from that moment.
As in current law, I08 the property subject to a durable power should
include only a single exception: homestead property of a married prin-
cipal, unless the spouse or the spouse's representative consents. This
exception reduces the possibility of unfairness to the spouse of an in-
capacitated principal. In addition, the statute should be given a com-
prehensive scope by explicitly authorizing all forms of surrogate
decisionmaking, including health care surrogacy. These powers should
include the authority to have access to records of the principal, to ap-
ply for benefits and insurance for the principal, and to have access to
the principal's person in the event of hospitalization.
Unless otherwise specified, the attorney in fact should have ultimate
priority, with the exception of the guardian, to make decisions for an
incapacitated principal. Indeed, the attorney in fact should be able to
engage in all acts reasonably necessary to carry out the responsibilities
to the principal and to overrule the inconsistent demands of other
friends or relatives. Without this priority, the attorney in fact might
be viewed as only one of several contenders for the right to make sur-
rogate decisions for the principal, a possibility that would only en-
courage litigation.
C. Perfecting & Revoking a Durable Power
Of all the proposals discussed above, only the Trammell Bill' 9 pro-
vides a reliable means of determining if and when a durable power has
become valid and when it has been revoked." 0 This is an admirable
trait, considering the confusion and lawsuits that might be generated
without such a feature. Accordingly, the new Florida statute should
require that a durable power, to become effective, must be recorded in
the courthouse in a county of the principal's choosing. Formalities
such as witnessing and notarization should be encouraged as a way of
pressing home the legal significance of the durable power and of pro-
viding for authentication in the event of a dispute.
Revocation should occur in two ways. The primary method should
be by recording a document in the same courthouse in which the dura-
ble power was filed. Recordation thus would provide "constructive"
108. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(3) (1989).
109. Fla. HB 1332 (1989).
110. See id.
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notice to the entire world, including the attorney in fact. This creates
a sure, reliable method of proving revocation, and it gives third par-
ties an easy method of determining the validity of a durable power.
However, two exceptions should exist. First, as to third parties act-
ing in reliance on the validity of a durable power, the durable power
should be deemed revoked when those persons have actual knowledge
either of the principal's death or of the revocation of the durable
power. Thus, anyone who knows that the durable power has ceased to
exist will not be privileged to take advantage of the principal's failure
to record a revocation. This feature will prevent some types of fraud
that might occur when a third party learns that a durable power no
longer is valid, but that a formal revocation, for whatever reason, has
not yet been filed. In the context of health care surrogacy, this feature
also will permit the principal to revoke the durable power simply by
informing treating health care providers.
Second, the durable power should be deemed revoked as to attor-
neys in fact when they have actual knowledge of the principal's death
or when the principal or the principal's guardian has informed the
attorney in fact that the durable power is revoked. This will impose on
the principal an obligation at least to inform the attorney in fact
about revocation. At the same time, it will give the principal a signifi-
cant protection against an attorney in fact who may be acting irre-
sponsibly. In the case of health care surrogacy, for example, the
principal could orally revoke the durable power by telling the attorney
in fact about the revocation.
D. Health Care Surrogacy
The State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that durable powers
are not abused in the area of surrogate health care decisionmaking. As
a result, several special limitations should be placed on durable pow-
ers that appoint a "health care surrogate." First, health care surro-
gacy should not be permitted unless the durable power expressly
authorizes it. This feature, also used in California,"' guarantees that a
health care surrogacy is not "implied" from a general or plenary du-
rable power.
Second, limits should be placed on who may witness a durable
power, and who may be the attorney in fact. In particular, persons
who might have a conflict of interest should be excluded." 2 For in-
stance, treating health care providers should not act as a health care
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2432(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
112. See id. § 2432(d), (e).
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surrogate even if they are relatives of the principal." 3 Otherwise, a
conflict of interest might be created that would diminish the objectiv-
ity of the health care surrogate. Similarly, persons witnessing a dura-
ble power creating a health care surrogacy should not be the attorney
in fact or any health care provider." 4 This feature will ensure that the
witnesses are not likely to have a conflict of interest at the time the
durable power is invoked.
As a third feature, the statute should create a presumption that the
principal is able to make health care decisions." 5 This presumption
would be defeated only through a certification process in which the
principal, after proper examination, is determined to be incapacitated.
After certification, the incapacity should not be presumed to be indef-
inite, but should continue only for the period of time in which the
principal is truly unable to make health care decisions.
The unwieldy certification process of the Gordon-Malchon
proposal" 6 should be avoided. Principals should be allowed to estab-
lish whatever certification process they wish, or in the absence of any
process, to be certified by the concurrence of at least two licensed
physicians. 1 7 However, an exception should be created for bona fide
emergencies, during which any treating physician could certify the
principal's incapacity. Also, each separate procedure performed on
the principal's body should be separately certified. This would require
a constant rechecking to verify that the principal really is incapaci-
tated.
Fourth, the statute should specifically authorize the health care sur-
rogate to have several powers related to health care. A health care
surrogate, for instance, should have a right of access to all medical,
employment, and financial records necessary to apply for benefits or
insurance or to make an informed health care decision. Similarly, the
health care surrogate should be allowed to withhold consent to treat-
ment. If authorized by the durable power, the health care surrogate
should be allowed to remove a dying principal to a setting of the prin-
cipal's choosing, with adequate provision for medical care. Likewise,
the health care surrogate should have authority to make funeral ar-
rangements if the principal has expressly delegated this authority, even
if these arrangements are completed after the principal's death.
Fifth, the statute should specify that the acts of a health care surro-
gate performed under a valid durable power of attorney, for legal pur-
113. Butsee id. § 2432.5.
114. See id. § 2432(d).
115. Accord id. § 2432(a).
116. See Fla. CS for HB 1135, § 5 (1989); Fla. CS for SB 900, § 5 (1989).
117. Accord Collin & Meyers, supra note 2, at 284.
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poses, are deemed to be acts of the principal. No health care surrogate
should be held criminally or civilly liable for reasonably prudent
health care decisions made under a valid durable power of attorney.
Similarly, health care providers should not be held liable for relying
on the surrogate's consent unless they also would have been liable if
the consent had been given by the principal.
Sixth, several types of decisionmaking should not be performed by
a health care surrogate. These should include decisions about with-
holding life support, commitment to or placement in a mental health
facility, convulsive or electroshock therapy, sterilization, abortion and
lobotomy, or any surgery that would permanently alter the structure
or function of the brain."'
Finally, health care providers should be expressly prohibited from
requiring patients to appoint a health care surrogate upon admission
or as a condition of treatment. 19 This will prevent abuses by health
care providers who otherwise might coerce the ill or dying into execut-
ing specific kinds of surrogacy. Health care surrogates should operate
at the behest of the principal, not at the behest of the treating health
care provider.
E. Alternate Attorneys in Fact & the Delegable Durable Power
The statute should explicitly authorize the principal to appoint al-
ternate attorneys in fact. The statute should allow principals to select
several persons who may act as a surrogate, thus increasing the likeli-
hood that one will be available when needed. In addition, the statute
should allow principals to make powers of attorney delegable, pro-
vided this is done expressly. This feature will permit the attorney in
fact to delegate the power if the need arises, perhaps to a class of
persons identified by the principal in the durable power of attorney.
F. Court Hearings Involving the Durable Power
An avenue for judicial review should be provided, similar to that
adopted in California. 20 Specifically, the Florida circuit courts should
be empowered to hear disputes involving termination, failure of attor-
neys in fact to account for their acts, and unfitness of the attorney in
fact.
In the case of a health care surrogate, the court should have several
special powers. For instance, the court should be authorized to com-
118. Accord CAL. CIV. CODE § 2435 (West Supp. 1989).
119. Accord id. § 2441.
120. See id. §§ 2412, 2412.5.
DURABLE POWER OF A TTORNEY
pel a health care provider to honor a valid durable power of attorney.
This provision will help ensure that the principal's wishes are not sty-
mied by the unreasonable actions of third parties. In addition, the
courts should be allowed to determine whether the health care surro-
gate is acting according to the desires or best interests of the principal
and if the surrogate is not so acting, to terminate the health care sur-
rogacy.
G. Phasing Out the Durable "Family" Power
Because this Proposal would constitute a substantial change in pres-
ent law, the Legislature should phase out the durable "family" power
of attorney over a period of one year. During this period, durable
"family" powers of attorney would remain enforceable as though
they had met the requirements of the new statute. This would give
residents of Florida an opportunity to execute new durable powers in
compliance with the new law. An exception should be made, however,
for durable powers that went into effect because of the principal's in-
capacity either before or during the one year grace period. These du-
rable powers should remain in force until the principal is no longer
incapacitated.
H. Relationship to Guardians
Finally, the new statute should specify the relationship of attorneys
in fact to guardians of the principal. Plenary guardians, those with
unlimited powers,12 1 should "stand in the shoes" of the ward/princi-
pal unless a court determines otherwise. Thus, plenary guardians
would be able to revoke and grant durable powers on behalf of the
ward/principal. Moreover, the ward/principal would not be deemed
incapacitated unless the plenary guardian was also incapacitated.
Thus, the attorney in fact would remain under the guardians' direc-
tion. This is based on the policy that the guardian, not the attorney in
fact, should make the ultimate decisions if so able.
Similar powers should inhere in limited guardians.' 22 However, lim-
ited guardians should not be permitted to grant or revoke durable
powers unless the court creating the guardianship has authorized it.
This will prevent limited guardians from exercising authority over
matters that may fall entirely outside of their powers. For example, a
limited guardian handling only business matters should not be allowed
121. See ch. 89-96, § 4, 1989 Fla. Laws 173, 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.102(8)(b)
(1989)) (defining "plenary guardian").
122. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.102(8)(a) (1989)) (defining "limited guardian").
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to exercise authority over a health care surrogate. Since health care
decisions remain within the power of the principal, the principal
should continue to exercise control over the health care surrogate.
However, whenever a court determines that the attorney in fact is an-
swerable to a limited guardian, the limited guardian should "stand in
the shoes" of the ward/principal in the same manner as discussed
above for plenary guardians. 123
V. CONCLUSION
Adoption of the Proposal presented in this Article and its Appendix
will accomplish two central goals: (1) making durable powers of attor-
ney more accessible to Floridians and (2) bringing the law on this sub-
ject into harmony with the 1989 guardianship reforms. Certainly, this
proposal is not the only conceivable way of achieving these results.
Others unquestionably exist. Accordingly, the author does not present
this Article as the only available solution to the problems of surrogate
decisionmaking in Florida.
Rather, the central concerns of this Article are the policies underly-
ing Florida durable power law. The current durable "family" power
of attorney embodies a policy that is, at best, perplexing. On the one
hand and for no apparent reason, the present statute restricts the class
of attorneys in fact to a narrow group of relatives. Yet having done
this, the statute then provides virtually no procedural safeguards to
ensure that the power is properly exercised by the family members
who receive it. Nor does the statute establish any method of encourag-
ing third parties to honor durable powers, such as by requiring that
durable powers be recorded in the public records. As a result, current
Florida law seems to encourage abuse and render durable powers ei-
ther unenforceable or inaccessible to most of the residents of Florida.
This is nonsensical. The general thrust of the proposals aired in
1989 by Representatives Trammell and Gordon and Senator Malchon
deserve reconsideration in future sessions of the Florida Legislature.
However, when this occurs, the Legislature should address all forms
of nonjudicial surrogate decisionmaking in a single comprehensive
bill. This will avoid confusion by allowing development of a coherent
philosophy about the role of surrogate decisionmaking in our society.
To this end, the present Article is intended not as a final solution, but
as a starting point that identifies concerns that have been overlooked
in the past.
123. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
A PROPOSED FLORIDA DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
Be it Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Section 709.08, Florida Statutes, is repealed.
Section 2. Section 709.20, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.20 Durable Power of Attorney.-
This Act consists of ss. 709.20-.30, Florida Statutes, and may be
cited as the Florida Durable Power of Attorney Act.
Section 3. Section 709.21, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.21 Findings; intent; construction.-
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that the needs of the elderly,
the terminally ill, and persons wishing to make adequate plans for fu-
ture incapacity, require a broadening of the existing law governing the
durable power of attorney. It is the intent of the Legislature to enable
all the residents of this state to create a durable power of attorney
adequate to meet their needs, with adequate safeguards to ensure that
the durable power of attorney is not abused and is properly enforced
according to the wishes of those who create a durable power of attor-
ney.
(2) This Act is intended as an alternative or supplement to formal
court proceedings by which a guardian or other fiduciary is appointed
by a court to manage the property, health care decisions and affairs of
a disabled or incapacitated person. The Legislature intends for the re-
sidents of this state to have access to a method of planning for illness
or incapacity that is less expensive and restrictive than guardianship,
and that may be a useful supplement to guardianship.
(3) This Act shall be liberally construed to achieve its intent and
purpose.
Section 4. Section 709.22, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.22 Definitions.-As used in this Act:
(1) The term "Act" means ss. 709.20-.30, Florida Statutes.
(2) An "attorney in fact" is the donee of a durable power of attor-
ney.
(3) A "common law power of attorney" is any power of attorney
that is not a durable power of attorney.
(4) A "durable power of attorney" or "power" is a power of attor-
ney executed as provided in this Act, by which a principal designates
another his attorney in fact, in a writing that contains the words:
(a) "This power of attorney shall not be affected by subsequent dis-
ability or incapacity of the principal, or lapse of time," or
(b) "This power of attorney shall become effective upon the disabil-
ity or incapacity of the principal," or
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(c) Similar words showing the intent of the principal that the au-
thority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the principal's
subsequent disability or incapacity, and, unless it states a time of ter-
mination, notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution of the
instrument.
(5) "Health care" means any care, treatment, service, or procedure
to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's physical or mental con-
dition, and all matters related to any of the foregoing or necessary for
the proper execution of any of the foregoing.
(6) A "health care decision" is consent, refusal of consent, or with-
drawal of consent to health care; the decision to apply for private,
public, government or Veteran's benefits to defray the cost of health
care; the right of access to all records of the principal reasonably nec-
essary for a health care surrogate to make decisions involving health
care and to apply for benefits; the right of access to the person of the
principal at all reasonable times; and acting on behalf of the principal
in all matters relating to health care, including but not limited to in-
surance, payment of insurance premiums, and other related matters.
(7) A "health care provider" is any person licensed by the state to
engage in a health-related profession; any facility licensed or certified
by the state to provide medical care or treatment, nursing home serv-
ices or health-related services of any type or description; and any em-
ployee or agent of such a person or facility.
(8) A "health care surrogate" is the donee of a durable power of
attorney that grants to the attorney in fact the authority to make
health care decisions for the principal.
(9) An "instrument" is the writing creating a durable power of at-
torney.
(10) "Limited guardian" shall be construed as provided in s.
744.102(8)(a), Fla. Stat.
(11) A "limited guardianship" exists when a limited guardian has
been appointed for a person.
(12) "Plenary guardian" shall be construed as provided in s.
744.102(8)(b), Fla. Stat.
(13) A "plenary guardianship" exists when a plenary guardian has
been appointed for a person.
(14) A "principal" is the donor of a durable power of attorney.
Section 5. Section 709.23, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.23 Scope of durable power of attorney; limitations.-
(1) All acts performed by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable
power of attorney during any period of disability or incapacity of the
principal shall have the same effect and inure to the benefit of and
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bind the principal and his successors in interest as if the principal were
competent and not disabled or incapacitated.
(2) Unless the instrument states a time of termination, the durable
power of attorney is exercisable notwithstanding the lapse of time
since the execution of the instrument.
(3) The scope of the durable power of attorney may be either:
(a) Plenary, in which event the attorney in fact may exercise all del-
egable legal and equitable rights and powers of the principal, except as
otherwise provided herein or by other applicable law; or
(b) Limited, in which event the attorney in fact may exercise only
the legal and equitable rights and powers specifically delegated by the
principal, except as otherwise provided herein or by other applicable
law.
(4) A durable power of attorney, whether plenary or limited, may
be either:
(a) Contingent, in which event the durable power of attorney shall
become effective only upon the occurrence of an event or at a time
described in the instrument creating the power, except as otherwise
provided herein; or
(b) Immediate, in which event the durable power of attorney shall
become effective on the date on which the instrument is properly exe-
cuted and recorded as provided in this Act.
(5) Upon becoming effective and subject to all other applicable law,
a durable power of attorney operates as a common law power of at-
torney during any period in which the principal is not incapacitated.
(6) A durable power of attorney that fails to meet the requirements
of this Act nevertheless may operate as a common law power of attor-
ney to the extent permitted by any other applicable law.
(7) Property subject to a durable power of attorney may, subject to
any limitations specified in the instrument itself, include all real and
personal property, all tangible and intangible property or interests, all
equitable interests and powers of appointment, leaseholds, intellectual
property, the donor's interest in any of the foregoing, and any other
interest treated as property under any applicable law, but does not
include homestead property of a married principal without the con-
sent of:
(a) The principal's spouse, if competent, or
(b) The spouse's legal guardian, if the spouse of the principal is not
competent, or
(c) The donee of a valid durable power of attorney executed by the
spouse of the principal.
(8) (a) The donee of a durable power of attorney may, subject to
any limitations specified in the instrument itself, be delegated author-
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ity to make binding decisions affecting the general safety, welfare, liv-
ing arrangements, or any personal or business affairs of the principal,
except as otherwise provided in this Act.
(b) Subject to any limitations specified in the instrument itself, a
durable power of attorney may delegate to the attorney in fact author-
ity to act as a health care surrogate only if the instrument complies
with the requirements of s. 709.26, Fla. Stat. A plenary durable power
of attorney does not authorize the attorney in fact to act as a health
care surrogate unless the requirements of s. 709.26, Fla. Stat., are
met.
(9) The attorney in fact appointed under a durable power of attor-
ney is a fiduciary of the principal or of the principal's estate or guard-
ian.
(10) Subject to any limitations contained in the instrument, the at-
torney in fact appointed under a durable power of attorney shall have
priority over any other person in making decisions for the principal,
except the principal or the plenary guardian of the principal, or except
as limited by the order of a court.
Section 6. Section 709.24, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.24 Form of durable power of attorney; recordation.-
(1) A durable power of attorney shall be in writing as provided
herein, signed or the signature acknowledged by the principal or his
guardian in the presence of two subscribing witnesses and of a sub-
scribing notary or other officer authorized to administer oaths, re-
corded as provided herein, and delivered to the attorney in fact.
(2) (a) A durable power of attorney shall contain a statement desig-
nating the county in which the power is to be recorded. To become
valid and effective, the durable power of attorney must first be re-
corded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for the county
designated in the instrument.
(b) A durable power of attorney shall contain the full name, address
and all available telephone numbers of the person designated as attor-
ney in fact or, if applicable, the person designated as a health care
surrogate.
(3) A durable power of attorney shall not be recorded in any county
other than the one designated in the instrument. Nothing in this sec-
tion precludes a principal from:
(a) Recording two or more separately executed durable powers of
attorney in separate counties, provided each instrument properly des-
ignates the county in which the instrument is actually filed.
(b) Recording two or more separately executed durable powers of
attorney in the same county, except that to the extent of any inconsis-
tency the most recently recorded instrument shall prevail.
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Section 7. Section 709.25, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.25 Revocation of durable power.-
(1) As to the entire world, including the attorney in fact, the dura-
ble power of attorney is revoked when a written revocation, executed
in substantially the manner provided in s. 709.24, Fla. Stat., is re-
corded in the public records of the county designated in the durable
power of attorney.
(2) In addition to the method of revocation in subsection (1), a du-
rable power of attorney is revoked as follows:
(a) As to any person, except the attorney in fact, acting in reliance
upon the validity of a durable power of attorney, the durable power
of attorney is revoked when such persons have actual knowledge that
the principal is dead or that the principal or the principal's guardian
has revoked the durable power of attorney.
(b) As to the attorney in fact alone, the durable power of attorney is
revoked when he has actual knowledge that the principal is dead or
when the principal or the principal's guardian informs the attorney in
fact that the durable power of attorney is revoked.
(3) When separate durable powers of attorney have been properly
recorded in the same county or in two or more counties, each must be
separately revoked.
Section 8. Section 709.26, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.26 Health care surrogates.-
(1) Any durable power of attorney may designate the attorney in
fact as a health care surrogate provided it does so expressly. It shall be
sufficient that the instrument creating the power includes the words
(a) "The attorney in fact may act as health care surrogate," or
(b) "The attorney in fact may make health care decisions," or
(c) Similar words indicating similar intent.
(2) Subject to the requirements of this section and this Act, a dura-
ble power of attorney may delegate to the attorney in fact powers in
addition to the powers of a health care surrogate.
(3) The attorney in fact named as a health care surrogate shall not
be a treating health care provider.
(4) Persons witnessing a durable power of attorney appointing a
health care surrogate shall not be the attorney in fact or a health care
provider.
(5) For purposes of this section:
(a) The principal shall be presumed to have the capacity to make
health care decisions unless determined to be incapable of doing so as
provided in this section.
(b) Incapacity shall be certified by whatever method is specified in
the instrument naming a health care surrogate, except that:
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(i) When the instrument creating the durable power provides no
procedure for determining incapacity, that determination shall be
made by two physicians licensed in Florida who have examined the
principal and who certify in writing in the principal's medical records
that the principal is unable to make health care decisions and is in
immediate need of a health care surrogate; or
(ii) In a bona fide medical emergency, the attending physician may
certify in the principal's medical records, either before or after treat-
ment is administered, that the principal was suffering from an acute
medical condition for which immediate treatment was necessary, that
the principal was unable to make health care decisions and that the
principal was in immediate need of a health care surrogate.
(c) Each procedure or treatment performed upon the body of the
principal pursuant to the authorization of a health care surrogate shall
be separately certified as required in subsection (b) and separately au-
thorized by the health care surrogate. However, in a bona fide medi-
cal emergency, the attending physician may rely in good faith upon a
prior valid certification and authorization.
(d) Incapacity of the principal shall not be considered indefinite,
but only for such length of time as the principal is unable to make
health care decisions.
(e) Subject to any limitations in the instrument creating the durable
power of attorney, the health care surrogate may refuse to consent to
any health care in the same manner as the principal if the principal
were not incapacitated.
(f) If specified in the instrument creating the durable power of at-
torney, the health care surrogate may make arrangements for a termi-
nally ill principal to die in a setting of the principal's choosing, if
adequate medical attention is provided.
(g) If specified in the instrument creating the durable power of at-
torney, the health care surrogate may make, oversee and complete fu-
neral arrangements for the principal, in keeping with the principal's
wishes, notwithstanding the fact that some or all of the acts necessary
for completing such funeral arrangements occur after the principal's
death.
(6) Consent for medical procedures or treatments given by a health
care surrogate in compliance with this section shall be regarded as
consent given by the principal.
(7) Physicians and health care providers relying upon the consent of
a health care surrogate pursuant to a valid durable power of attorney
shall be liable criminally or in tort only to the extent that they would
have been so liable had the principal given the consent.
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(8) A health care surrogate shall not be civilly or criminally liable
for reasonably prudent health care decisions made in good faith ac-
cording to the terms of a valid durable power of attorney executed as
provided in this Act and this section.
(9) A health care surrogate may not:
(a) Execute a living will on behalf of the principal or decide to ter-
minate health care that within a reasonable degree of medical cer-
tainty will result in the principal continuing to live indefinitely; but the
health care surrogate may be authorized to disclose the existence of a
living will to health care providers and relatives of the principal.
(b) Consent to any of the following on behalf of the principal:
(i) Commitment to or placement in a mental health treatment facil-
ity;
(ii) Convulsive or electroshock therapy;
(iii) Sterilization;
(iv) Abortion;
(v) Lobotomy or any procedure intended to permanently alter the
structure or function of the brain.
(10) Subject to any limitations of the instrument itself, a durable
power of attorney may authorize a health care surrogate to have ac-
cess to the principal's financial records, insurance records, payroll re-
ceipts, state or federal tax records, medical records, employment
records, or any other information reasonably necessary for the health
care surrogate to make a health care decision, and the health care sur-
rogate may consent to the disclosure of any of the foregoing, to the
same extent that the principal would have been able to do so if not
incapacitated.
(11) A health care surrogate shall have first priority of access to the
principal at all times when acting as a health care surrogate.
(12) (a) A health care provider shall be subject to professional disci-
pline or revocation of license if the health care provider, as a condi-
tion of treatment or admission, requires an individual to execute a
durable power of attorney designating a health care surrogate.
(b) The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the
Department of Professional Regulation shall adopt rules to implement
this subsection.
Section 9. Section 709.27, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.27 Alternate attorneys in fact and health care surrogates; dele-
gation of power.-
(1) A durable power of attorney may designate alternate attorneys
in fact or health care surrogates and may specify the conditions upon
which the alternates shall assume the power.
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(2) A durable power of attorney shall not be delegable unless the
instrument creating the power so specifies. Delegation of the durable
power shall occur only under such conditions as are provided in the
instrument creating the power.
Section 10. Section 709.28, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.28 Petition for determination; purposes.-
(1) A petition may be filed under this section by any of the follow-
ing:
(a) The attorney in fact or health care surrogate;
(b) The principal;
(c) The spouse or any child of the principal;
(d) The guardian of the principal, whether limited or plenary;
(e) Any person who would take property of the principal under the
laws of intestate succession if the principal were dead at the time the
petition is filed, whether or not the principal has a will;
(f) A treating health care provider with respect to a durable power
of attorney appointing a health care surrogate;
(g) A parent of the principal with respect to a durable power of
attorney appointing a health care surrogate.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), a petition for determina-
tion in equity may be filed in the circuit court under this Act for any
one or more of the following purposes:
(a) Determining whether the durable power of attorney is in effect
or has been terminated;
(b) Passing on the acts or proposed acts of the attorney in fact;
(c) Compelling the attorney in fact to account and report for his
acts to the principal, the spouse of the principal, the guardian of the
principal, the estate of the principal, or such other person as the court
in its discretion may require. A petition shall not be filed unless the
attorney in fact has failed to submit an accounting and report within
60 days after written request from the person filing the petition;
(d) Declaring that an alternate attorney in fact appointed by the
principal shall succeed to the powers delegated by the durable power
of attorney upon a determination by the court of all the following:
(i) The present attorney in fact has violated or is unfit to perform
the fiduciary duties under the durable power of attorney,
(ii) At the time of the determination by the court, the principal
lacks the capacity to give or to revoke a power of attorney, and
(iii) The determination is in the best interests of the principal or the
principal's estate;
(e) Declaring that the durable power of attorney is terminated upon
a determination by the court of all of the following:
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(i) The attorney in fact has violated or is unfit to perform the fidu-
ciary duties under the durable power of attorney,
(ii) At the time of the determination by the court, the principal
lacks the capacity to give or to revoke a power of attorney,
(iii) The termination of the power of attorney is in the best interest
of the principal or the principal's estate, and
(iv) The principal has not named an alternate attorney in fact who is
available to succeed to the powers delegated by the durable power of
attorney.
(3) With respect to a durable power of attorney appointing a health
care surrogate, a petition may also be filed under this section for any
one or more of the following purposes:
(a) Determining whether the durable power of attorney is in effect
or has terminated;
(b) Compelling a health care provider to honor a valid durable
power of attorney;
(c) Determining whether the acts or proposed acts of the health care
surrogate are, in fact, consistent with the desires of the principal as
expressed in the durable power of attorney or otherwise made known
to the court or, where the desires of the principal are unknown or
unclear, whether the acts or proposed acts of the health care surrogate
are in the best interest of the principal;
(d) Compelling the health care surrogate to report his or her acts as
health care surrogate to the principal, spouse of the principal, guard-
ian of the principal, or to any other person the court in its discretion
may require, if
(i) The health care surrogate has failed to submit such a report
within 10 days after the written request from the person filing the peti-
tion, or
(ii) The health care surrogate has refused to provide an immediate
justification for a decision of the health care surrogate alleged to be
life-threatening to the principal;
(e) Declaring that an alternate health care surrogate appointed by
the principal shall succeed to the powers delegated under the durable
power of attorney upon a determination by the court of either of the
following:
(i) The present health care surrogate has made a health care decision
for the principal that authorized anything illegal, or
(ii) The present health care surrogate has violated, has failed to per-
form, or is unfit to perform, the duty under the durable power of
attorney to act consistent with the desires of the principal or, where
the desires of the principal are unknown or unclear, is acting (by ac-
tion or inaction) in a manner that is clearly contrary to the best inter-
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ests of the principal; and at the time of the determination by the
court, the principal lacks the capacity to give or to revoke a durable
power of attorney;
(f) Declaring that the durable power of attorney, to the extent it
appoints a health care surrogate, is terminated upon a determination
by the court of both of the following:
(i) No alternate health care surrogate has been named who is availa-
ble to succeed to the powers delegated under the durable power of
attorney, and
(ii) The health care surrogate has made a health care decision for
the principal that authorized anything illegal or upon a determination
by the court that:
(A) The health care surrogate has violated, has failed to perform, or
is unfit to perform, the duty under the durable power of attorney to
act consistent with the desires of the principal or, where the desires of
the principal are unknown or unclear, is acting (by action or inaction)
in a manner that is clearly contrary to the best interests of the princi-
pal, and
(B) At the time of the determination by the court, the principal
lacks the capacity to give or to revoke a durable power of attorney.
(4) Proceedings under this section shall be heard in equity in the
circuit court of the county in which the attorney in fact or health care
surrogate is a resident, in the county in which the principal is presently
located or in the county in which the durable power of attorney is
recorded, and shall be conducted according to rules adopted by the
Supreme Court of Florida to implement this section.
Section 11. Section 709.29, Florida Statutes, is created to read:
709.29 Relation of attorney in fact to guardian.-
(1) (a) An attorney in fact is answerable to a plenary guardian of
the principal as though the plenary guardian were the principal.
(b) A plenary guardian may execute a durable power of attorney on
behalf of the ward as though the plenary guardian were the ward, un-
less the court creating the guardianship has determined otherwise as
provided in s. 744.3115, Fla. Stat.
(2) (a) An attorney in fact is answerable to a limited guardian of the
principal as though the limited guardian were the principal only if the
court appointing the limited guardian has so authorized.
(b) A limited guardian may grant a durable power of attorney on
behalf of the ward only to the extent authorized by the court creating
the guardianship, in which event the attorney in fact shall be answera-
ble to the guardian as though the guardian were the principal.
(3) The fact that a guardian of the principal has been appointed
does not of itself revoke a prior durable power of attorney granted by
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the principal unless the court creating the guardianship has so or-
dered.
(4) For purposes of this Act alone, the principal shall not be deemed
incapacitated unless the principal's guardian, if one has been ap-
pointed, also is incapacitated.
Section 12. Section 709.30 is created to read:
709.30 Effect on other forms of durable powers.-
(1) No durable power of attorney executed in this state after the
effective date of this Act shall be valid or enforceable unless the dura-
ble power of attorney complies with the requirements of this Act.
(2) A durable power of attorney executed in this state prior to the
effective date of this Act, if it was valid and enforceable under any
law in force at the time and in the jurisdiction of execution, shall be
deemed valid and enforceable for a period of one year after the effec-
tive date of this Act notwithstanding the fact that the durable power
of attorney does not comply with the requirements of this Act.
(3) After one year has elapsed from the effective date of this Act,
no durable power of attorney executed in this state prior to the effec-
tive date of this Act shall be deemed valid and enforceable unless:
(a) The durable power of attorney has complied with the require-
ments of this Act; or
(b) The durable power of attorney was valid and enforceable under
the law in force at the time and in the jurisdiction of execution, the
principal has become incapacitated, and the attorney in fact has val-
idly assumed duties delegated by the durable power of attorney under
the law in force at the time the duties were assumed; but any durable
power of attorney made valid by this subsection shall continue in
force only so long as the principal is incapacitated.
(4) All durable powers of attorney made enforceable by operation
of this section despite failure to conform to the requirements of this
Act shall be subject to s. 709.28, Fla. Stat.
Section 13. Section 744.345, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
744.345 Letters of guardianship.-
Letters of guardianship shall be issued to the guardian and shall
specify whether the guardianship pertains to the person, or the prop-
erty, or both, of the ward. The letters must state whether the guardi-
anship is plenary or limited, and, if limited, the letters must state the
powers and duties of the guardian. The letters must state whether the
guardian is authorized to grant durable powers of attorney on behalf
of the ward; and, if the guardianship is limited, must state the extent
to which the guardian is authorized to act on behalf of the ward with
regard to any durable powers of attorney previously executed by the
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ward. Failure to issue letters shall not affect the validity of the order
appointing the guardian.
Section 14. Section 744.3115 is created to read:
744.3115 Durable power of attorney.-
(1) In every proceeding by which a guardian is appointed under this
chapter, the court shall determine whether the ward prior to his inca-
pacity has executed any valid durable power of attorney, including
any durable power of attorney appointing a health care surrogate, un-
der any applicable law. If any such durable power of attorney exists,
the court in its discretion shall:
(a) Specify in its order and letters of guardianship what authority, if
any, the guardian shall exercise over the attorney in fact; or
(b) With notice to the attorney in fact and any other appropriate
parties, order revocation of the durable power of attorney; and the
order shall be entered as a revocation of the durable power of attor-
ney in the records of the clerk of the court in the county in which the
durable power of attorney has been recorded.
(2) A plenary guardian may execute or revoke any durable power of
attorney on behalf of the ward unless the court, in its discretion, has
specified otherwise in its order or letters of guardianship.
(3) A limited guardian is not authorized to execute or revoke any
durable power of attorney on behalf of the ward unless expressly au-
thorized by the court in its order creating the guardianship or in the
letters of guardianship.
